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I.

Introduction

The right of peremptory challenge is "one of the most important of the
rights secured to the accused."1 It is "an essential part of the trial,"2 and,
more specifically, "essential to the impartiality of the trial.,,3 "The central
function of the right of peremptory challenge is to enable a litigant to

* Law Clerk, United States District Judge James M. Rosenbaum, District of Minnesota;
J.D., 1998, The University of Texas School of Law; B.A., 1994, Macalester College. I thank
Reid Neuriter, Michael E. Tigar, Adam Thurschwell, George Dix, Michael Gordon, and the
editors of the American Journal ofCriminal Law for their valuable assistance in developing and
editing this Article. I also express my enormous thanks to Dena Childs for her patience.
1. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
2. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892).
3. Id. at 378.
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remove a certain number of potential jurors who are not challengeable for
cause, but in whom the litigant perceives bias or hostility."4 Despite their
importance-indeed, despite their characterization as "essential" to fairness,
a term often used in describing constitutional protections-and their long
standing prominence,s peremptory challenges are not guaranteed by the
Constitution. 6 Instead, they are provided by state statute' or by Act of
Congress. s
Unique among the rights guaranteed to litigants,9 the peremptory
challenge is extraordinarily important yet not constitutional in nature.
Although Congress or state legislatures could presumably refuse to allow
peremptory challenges at all,IO every jurisdiction has recognized their
perceived essential nature in the general effort to provide fair trials. Every
jurisdiction has provided for peremptory challenges in one form or anoth
er.1I
But what happens when the right to peremptory challenges is abridged
or denied in a way which is more or less arbitrary? Can a jury resulting

from such abridgment or denial be acceptable, or must any conviction or
4. United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1996).
5. See Lewis, 146 U.S. at 376 ("The right of chaIlenge comes from the common law with
the trial by jury itself, and has always been held essential to the fairness of trial by jury. ");
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-13 (1965) ("The peremptory chaIlenge has very old
credentials.") (citing The Ordinance for Inquests, 33 Edw. I, Stat. 4 (1305».
6. See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919). The Court has noted that an
argument "that the requirement ofan 'impartial jury' impliedly compels peremptory challenges"
would be "plausibl[e]" while specificaIly noting its holdings to the contrary. Holland v.
Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 482 (1990) (citing Stilson, 250 U.S. at 586).
7. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 655 (West 1992); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
35.15 (Vernon 1989 & Supp. 1996).
8. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (providing a felony defendant ten peremptory
challenges and the government six); 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1998) (providing three peremptory
challenges for each party in civil trials in federal court); Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (1998) (providing an equal number of peremptories
to the defendant and the government in capital cases).
9. The use of the term "litigant," rather than "defendant," is intentional. It is important
to remember that the strength of the right to peremptory challenge, in whatever form it exists,
does vary based on whether one is a criminal defendant or a civil litigant. This Article focuses
primarily on the criminal context.
10. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 89 (1988) ("[p]eremptory challenges are a
creature of statute and are not required by the Constitution") (citing Gray v. Mississippi, 481
U.S. 648, 663 (1987»; Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 ("[T]here is nothing in the Constitution of the
United States which requires the Congress (or the States) to grant peremptory challenges"); cf.
Stilson, 250 U.S. at 583 (noting the broad power Congress has to regulate the number of
peremptory challenges available to defendants, including requiring codefendants to be treated
as a single defendant, thus allowing a small proportion of the number of challenges available
if tried separately).
11. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 216 & n.18 (cataloging representative peremptory challenge
statutes of the states).
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verdict resulting from such a jury be reversed? More specifically, to what
extent ought the peremptory challenge process function as a "safety valve"
for errors in deciding challenges for cause-that is, what should happen
when a trial judge erroneously refuses to strike a veniremember for cause
and the litigant to whom that veniremember is adverse is forced (either by
law or by practicality) to exercise one of her peremptory challenges to
eliminate the possibly adverse potential juror? Is being forced to "fix" the
errors of the judge so contrary to the purposes of peremptory challenges
that we ought not allow it if it has the effect of taking away a peremptory
challenge which a litigant would have used? More specifically, on appeal
(direct or collateral), should the trial court's effective denial of a challenge
to which the litigant was otherwise entitled constitute per se reversible
error? If so, in what contexts should it be considered error-that is, should
it matter if a federal court is considering a direct appeal from a federal
proceeding or is instead considering a habeas corpus proceeding arising out
of a state court?12
These are the questions considered by this Article. The issues they
raise are discussed in four Parts. In Part n, I provide a history and
overview of peremptory challenges and their relationship with challenges
for cause. That discussion includes an outline of the various types of state
statutes and state case law related to the mandatory or permissive use of
peremptory challenges to correct perceived error in deciding challenges for
cause. Part II also includes a discussion of the current law of error
analysis in the federal courts and recent trends in that area of law.

Part mconsists of a review of the Supreme Court case law involving

error analysis and peremptory challenges. Ross v. Oklahoma l3 has been
read by at least one court of appeals (as discussed in Part IV) as definitive
ly endorsing harmless error analysis for all abridgements or denials of
peremptory challenges; this Part provides the argument for why that may
not be so, and in doing so endorses the approach of the majority of circuit
courts to address the issue. Put simply, the Part examines the specific
situation, and the specific feature of Oklahoma law, that led to Ross. That
feature is critical in limiting Ross.
With that interpretation of Ross in mind, Part IV turns to the courts'
responses to related situations, contrasting those interpreting Ross as a
broad directive with those that limit it to its procedural posture. I conclude
that the latter courts are correct in viewing Ross as by no means the final

12. This Article does not consider what should happen in state appellate courts on direct
review, except tangentially. Individual states' precedents regarding trial error vary and are
beyond the scope of this Article. Thus, I will only consider the various situations likely to be
faced by a federal court.
13. 487 U.S. 81 (1988).
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word in consideration of error involving peremptory challenges. The
former courts fail to recognize the unique situation faced by the Ross court
as laid out in Part ill; without such recognition, they fail to distinguish the
cases they face from Ross.
Part V combines the conclusions of the previous Parts and presents my
conclusions. I argue that Ross can and should be limited in a principled
way to the context in which a state, in its peremptory challenge scheme,
has chosen to impose two separate policy goals for peremptory challenges
by requiring a litigant to use a peremptory challenge to preserve error in
deciding a challenge for cause. I conclude that Ross can be limited to
situations where a jurisdiction specifically requires the use of peremptory
challenges to strike jurors whom a litigant believes should have been struck
for cause, thus eliminating its applicability to most state court judgments
and all federal appeals of federal convictions. 14

II.

Peremptory Challenges and Error Analysis

1\vo long-standing and evolving areas of law intersect when consid
ering the appropriate responses to the questions posed above: the law of
peremptory challenges and the doctrine of harmless error. Specifically
regarding peremptory challenges, explored in the first subpart, we must
consider the policies furthered by allowing such challenges, as well as any
distinction between federal peremptory challenge law and state peremptory
challenge law. This second area is not limited to the rather obvious
differences in schemes, but also includes consideration of whether federal
interests in peremptory challenges ought to be given any more weight by
federal courts than state interests in the same. As for harmless error,
considered in the second subpart, we must explore the development of the
doctrine and examine how courts generally, and the United States Supreme
Court specifically, determine whether a particular variety of error is
properly the subject of harmless error analysis. As it turns out, how this
determination is made is, not surprisingly, largely dispositive of the result
of the determination. Also highly relevant to-and often predictive of-the
result is the party on whom the burden of proof is placed in establishing

harm or the lack thereof while on appeal.

14. As discussed in Part V, this is not really quite my complete proposal. If a litigant still
holds unused peremptory challenges at the end of jury selection, her use of peremptory
challenges has not been hampered and no harm can be shown. Without any showing of even
the potential for harm, no analysis is necessary.

1999]

A.

The Intersection of Peremptory Challenges

53

Peremptory Challenges: Unquestionably Important But Not
Guaranteed

For at least a century, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
right of a criminal defendant to peremptory challenge is "one of the most
important of the rights secured"ls to her. Though the right is generally
framed as important to criminal defendants, its nature as "a means to
achieve the end of an impartial jury"16 is applicable also to civil liti
gants. 17
Legislatures have also consistently recognized the importance of
peremptory challenges. Congress first provided for their existence for
defendants in 179018 and virtually all of the states followed suit in the
next eighty years. 19 The prosecution's right to peremptory challenge is
long-standing as well. Early cases concluded that the prosecutors had
retained the English practice of the Crown's right to set aside jurors,20
which was essentially identical to the peremptory challenge. The accepted
view endorsing the peremptory challenge was well-stated by Blackstone:
"No man should be tried by anyone man against whom he has conceived
a prejudice, even without being able to assign a reason for such his
dislike. "21
Despite judicial and legislative recognition of the importance of
peremptory challenges to the selection of a jury, it has not been held to be
constitutionally guaranteed.22 Though there have been various arguments
presented for constitutionalizing the right to make peremptory strikes,23

15. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
16. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 u.s. 81, 88 (1988).
17. Of course, other rights and protections-i.e., due process rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the right against compelled self-incrimination, and so on-attach in
a criminal proceeding, any or all of which may affect an error analysis.
18. See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 112, 119 (1790) (allowing 35
peremptories in treason trials and 20 for other felonies punishable by death).
19. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 216 & n.18 (cataloging state cases and statutes
related to the allowance of peremptory challenges).
20. See id. at 216 & n.17 (citing Waterford & Whitehall Turnpike Co. v. People, 9 Barb.
161 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1850» (noting a common-law right to peremptory challenges for the
prosecution based on the similar English right); Commonwealth v. Eisenhower, 37 A. 521
(1897) (same); Jewell v. Commonwealth, 22 Pa. 94, 100 (1853) (same); State v. Arthur, 13
N.C. 217, 219 (1829) (same).
21. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 442 (David S. Berkowitz et al. eds., 1978).
22. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 89 (1988); Swain, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); cf.
Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 583 (1919).
23. See, e.g., Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27
STAN. L. REV. 545, 555-56 (1975); Andrea B. Horowitz, Note, Ross v. Oklahoma: A Strike
Against Peremptory Challenges, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 219, 237-38. But see Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 107 (1986) (Marshall, 1., concurring) ("The inherent potential of peremptory
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the Court has steadfastly refused to do so, despite its willingness in other
contexts to label long-standing rights important to the fairness of trials as
constitutional.24 Thus, these rights are in a unique and somewhat
uncomfortable position: everyone (or at least almost everyone) feels they
are very important to a fair trial, but they exist solely at the whim of the
states and of Congress.
Against this emphatically nonconstitutional backdrop, states have
chosen a variety of schemes providing for peremptory challenges. The
numbers of challenges allowed varies, as does the number of challenges
granted to the governments as compared to the defendant in criminal cases.
Most important to this Article, however, are how the provisions regarding
the peremptory challenges and challenges for cause intersect.
In many states, challenges for cause are separate conceptually from
peremptory challenges. 25 Challenges for cause, which are constitutionally
protected,26 are inherently required for the provision of an unbiased jury:

challenges to distort the jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds
should ideally lead the Court to ban them entirely from the criminal justice system. "); Morris
B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U.
CHI. L. REV. 809 (1997); Brent I. Gurney, Note, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory
Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227 (1986). Many of the calls
for the abolishment of peremptory challenges rely on the perceived use of such challenges in
race-conscious jury selection, despite the Court's efforts in Batson to eliminate such race-based
actions. Hoffman, supra, at 830-44. The continued presence of peremptory challenges
arguably results in the persistence of trials as gamesmanship rather than something more like
a dignified search for truth. See id. at 865-70.
24. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (adopting the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal cases); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 243-45 (1978) (setting
the minimum number of jurors in a criminal case at six); Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130,
138-39 (1979) (requiring unanimity in criminal juries with six members). An alternative
approach which the Court has not apparently considered would be to treat the use of peremptory
challenges as a means to the constitutionally-required end of a fair trial, in the same way the
Court established the Miranda rule as a means to implementing the constitutionally-required end
of obtaining confessions constitutionally. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In
that case, the Court noted that it was possible that another way to achieve the goal might be
possible, but until a state came up with it, the Court would require the exclusion of evidence
obtained from custodial interrogations without the Miranda safeguards (with numerous
exceptions, of course). See id. at 467. Here, the Court could hold that peremptory challenges
are not required by the Constitution, but that until a state can demonstrate that another means
is as effective at affording a fair trial, peremptory challenges will be required. In any case, that
issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
25. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Auguste, 605 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 1992) (holding that the
"wasted" peremptory challenges correcting the judges' error should result in automatic
reversal); State v. Ramos, 564 N.W.2d 328 (Wisc. 1997) (same). In my examination of the
issue, roughly one-third of the states which have decided the issue keep percmptories and
challenges for cause conceptually separate, as does the federal system.
26. See, e.g., Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85 (1988) ("It is well settled that the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a defendant on trial for his life the right to an impartial
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if a litigant cannot have biased veniremembers removed, any verdict is
constitutionally unacceptable. Ordinarily, peremptory challenges are
considered as intended to be used for jurors who are not so biased as to
deserve a for-cause strike but still cause concern for one litigant or another.
Thus, the portion of the venire likely to be targeted by peremptory
challenges is ordinarily a different one than that targeted by challenges for
cause. Certainly the peremptory challenge process is relevant to the for
cause strike process: if a veniremember is undesirable enough to cause a
litigant to wish her to be struck for cause, she will usually be a desired
target of a peremptory challenge as well if the for-cause challenge is
denied. But the important issue is to what extent a state can require the
peremptory process to serve as the "backup" for the for-cause process.
Other states-including Oklahoma, at issue in Ross-require the use
of a peremptory challenge to preserve the perceived error in the for-cause
strike.27 Unless the defendant complaining of an erroneous denial of a
challenge for cause strikes the veniremember with a peremptory challenge,
runs out of peremptory challenges, and is again denied a challenge for
cause erroneously, the makeup of the jury will be essentially unchallenge
able. In having such a requirement, Oklahoma and other similar states
have blurred the distinction between challenges for cause and peremptory
challenges, requiring the use of a peremptory challenge as a safety valve
for error by the judge.
At first blush, this requirement seems sensible, and there is no reason

to think it is not a permissible choice for a state to make. It helps ensure
that "close call" jurors are removed from the jury one way or another. It
provides an obligation to litigants to help the judge hold a "clean" trial,
one free of constitutional errors. In any case where the litigants do not end
up using all of their peremptory challenges, the requirement has no
apparent ill effects, and I do not propose that such litigants have any claim,
as no harm can be shown, even though an error was made.
But the effects of such a policy-especially post-Ross-can be more
pernicious if we really consider peremptory challenges to be essential to a
fair trial and if a litigant is forced to use a peremptory challenge to remove
a juror when she would otherwise use the challenge elsewhere (and she

jury. "). There are challenges for cause which are not constitutionally protected-i.e., Texas's
disqualification of any veniremember who has been convicted of any theft. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PRoe. ANN. art. 35.16(a)(2) (Vernon 1989 & Supp. 1996). I limit my discussion to
those situations in which a veniremember should be removed because he is not qualified
constitutionally to sit on the jury, which, to put it briefly, are those who are not "impartial."
27. See Ferrell v. State, 475 P.2d 825, 828 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970). The statute in
Oklahoma is silent as to this requirement; it has been implemented as a matter of Oklahoma
judge-made law. See also, e.g., People v. Samayoa, 938 P.2d 2 (Cal. 1997); State v. Barlow,
541 N.W.2d 309 (Minn. 1995). Roughly two-thirds of the states I have examined have so held.
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runs out of peremptory challenges). In fact, it has the potential to fully
insulate a judge's decisions on for-cause challenges from review, even if
obviously wrong, so long as the errors do not outnumber a litigant's
peremptory challenges. It therefore can essentially eliminate, in some
cases, any right to peremptory challenges in the traditional sense.28 In
other words, if a judge in a capital case in Oklahoma refuses to strike nine
veniremembers whose answers in voir dire make it evident that they would
automatically vote to impose the death penalty without consideration of
mitigating circumstances,29 the defendant would be forced to exercise a
peremptory challenge for each of the nine to have any hope of appellate
review of the error. Even then, only if the judge made another mistake on
a for-cause challenge would reversal be mandated. Thus, the defendant
would in fact have none of the peremptory challenges to which she is
entitled, because all nine of them would have been used in correcting the
judge's error. Moreover, even this arguably arbitrary denial of peremptory
challenges would not be error under Ross if considered on federal review,
so long as the judge's errors were limited to those nine veniremembers.
This problem, and the facts of Ross, are discussed more fully in Part ill,
so for now it will do to point it out as a source of concern.
It is too early to see if Ross will be seen by states as an invitation to
change their statutes or case law to reduce the power of peremptory

challenges for criminal defendants. Of course, if states are inclined to
reduce defendants' ability to use peremptory challenges, they could choose
to simply eliminate the peremptory process entirely. However, a structure
such as Oklahoma's has an advantage of appearance over one in which no
peremptories exist at all-that is, it does not look like the state is eviscerat
ing the defendants' rights and the trials still look like trials with which the
public is familiar. Perhaps this assumes more concern about appearances
than state legislatures truly have (and more concern about defendants'
rights than legislatures or the voting public actually possess), but it is at
least not laughable to see this structure as appealing to image-conscious
state politicians.
28. By "in the traditional sense" I mean to acknowledge that, even in these cases, the
litigants will ordinarily exercise the statutory number of peremptory challenges in a purely
literal way-that is, they will strike the appropriate number of veniremembers using peremptory
chaIlenges. However, the traditional sense of peremptory challenges is that they are used to
strike veniremembers not removable for cause. In that sense, the litigants are without some or
all of their peremptory chaIlenges.
29. Such consideration is required by the Supreme Court's capital jurisprudence, including
(but by no means limited to) Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (striking
down all capital sentencing schemes as unconstitutional due to the unbridled and unguided
discretion given juries), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (affirming a death sentence
imposed under a "balancing" procedure with a separate sentencing phase to consider
aggravating and mitigating evidence).
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Federal law does not require the use of peremptory challenges to
"cure" trial court error in deciding for-cause challenges. 3o As discussed
in the next subpart, this results in three possible scenarios in which a
federal court would be considering these questions. These scenarios have
important distinctions among them.

B. The Proper Role ofAppellate Courts in Review: ItHarmless Error"
The various questions posed by the various schemes providing
peremptory challenges arise in more than one procedural posture. They
can arise on direct appeal in state appellate courts, on direct review to the
United States Supreme Court (as in Ross), on direct appeal in federal
appellate courts from federal district courts, or on collateral review in the
federal courts from state or federal proceedings. The rigor with which
alleged error will be examined varies, of course, in different contexts, as
does the placement of the burden on appeal. Additional deference is given
to state court conclusions in the habeas corpus context.
The harmless error approach was described in Chapman v. Califor
31
nia.
"Under Chapman, a constitutional error requires reversal [on
direct review] unless the state-the 'beneficiary of the error'-can 'prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute
to the verdict obtained.' "32 In contrast, on collateral review, Brecht v.
Abrahamson33 mandates that a constitutional error requires reversal only
if it "had [a] substantial and injurious effect or influence in detennining the
jury's verdict.,,34
Beyond the standard applied, another critical issue is on which party
the burden of establishing or refuting that standard is placed. For an error
whose "natural effect is to prejudice a litigant's substantial rights, "35 the
burden to establish the lack of a substantial influence or grave doubt is on

30. As noted previously, however, litigants have a great incentive to strike these jurors
anyway. If the stock of peremptory challenges is not exhausted, this has no harm and a great
deal of value to judicial economy. If however, a litigant runs out of peremptory challenges,
the discussion in the text is relevant. It is also worth noting that the government in Martinez
Salazar, recently considered by the Supreme Court, has proposed adding such a requirement
in the federal system. This Article does not address this issue in detail, but it seems evident
that reading such a requirement would be more construing the rules, but would be instead a
significant addition to the rules that perhaps should be left to Congress.
31. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
32. John H. Blume & Steven P. Garvey, Harmless Error in Federal Habeas Corpus After
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 165 (1993) (quoting Chapman, 386
U.S. at 24).
33. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
34. Id. at 637 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946».
35. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765.
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the prosecution;36 for technical errors (all others), the burden to establish
the presence of a substantial influence or grave doubt is on the defen
dant.37
Brecht did leave some ambiguity as to the allocation of this burden on

collateral review.

However, when one adds up the concurring and

dissenting votes which make evident their view that the burden remains on
the state, even on collateral review, it appears that five votes favored that
view. 38 A shift of the burden to the petitioner on habeas corpus review
would arguably make it virtually impossible for petitioners on habeas
corpus review to prevail on jury issues. Consider the difficulty of
establishing, to a higher standard, that an error in jury selection had such
a substantial impact on a jury's verdict, with no way to evaluate what
happened inside the jury room.
A court considering an appeal must also decide whether to apply
harmless error doctrine at all. The primary issue involved in making that
decision is "whether the error is a classic 'trial error, ,,,39 or instead
structural error. The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of how
to identify which issues are appropriate for harmless error analysis in
Arizona v. Fulminate. 40 There, the Court considered whether admission
of evidence of a coerced confession could ever be harmless error.
Historically, the use of such confessions has always been seen as constitu
tionally impermissible and grounds for automatic reversal. 41 In consider
ing whether such erroneous admission warranted reversal, the Court
defined "trial error" as "error which occurred during the presentation of

36. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 ("[C]onstitutional error ••. casts on someone other than
the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless. ") (referencing Pahy v.
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963».
37. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 760-61.
38. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 647 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 653 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); id. at 641 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Sherman v. Smith, No. 92-6947, 1993
U.S. App. LEXIS 28095, at *9-10 (4th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the burden of establishing
harmless error remains on the state when non-"technical" errors are involved); Blume &
Garvey, supra note 32, at 166-69 (concluding that the burden should remain on the state post
Brecht).
39. United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132, 1143 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Arizona v.
Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991».
40. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
41. See Fulminate, 499 U.S. at 288 (White, J., dissenting in part). The Court stated:
The majority today abandons what until now the Court has regarded at the
'axiomatic [proposition] that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due
process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an
involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession

,

Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376
(1964».
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the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in
the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its
admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. "42 On the other
hand, "structural errors" are "defects in the constitution of the trial
mechanism, which defy analysis by 'harmless-error' standards.... [and
affect] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply
an error in the trial process itself. "43 The error in question-the errone
ous introduction of a coerced confession-fell into the former category,
according to the Court, contrary to the long-held rule treating such
introduction as automatically reversible error.44 Applying harmless-error
analysis, the conviction was affirmed. 45
Thus, a number of rabbit trails can be followed in considering a
harmless-error claim. One must determine if the error is amenable at all
to harmless-error analysis, considering the trial-structural error definition
dichotomy. Even if the doctrine does apply, the burden of establishing
harm may be on the defendant if the error is deemed technical. Additional
ly, when the error is being considered on habeas review, the level of
scrutiny is somewhat lower and the Court may eventually decide to shift
the burden to the defendant, though for now it appears to remain on the

prosecution for nontechnical errors.
As a whole, the trend in recent years has been toward the increased
use of harmless-error analysis to insulate state court decisions from reversal
by federal courts on constitutional grounds. It is remarkably easy to draft
an opinion that says, "Even if this was indeed error, we cannot say that the
outcome would have been any different had the decision been made in the
defendant's favor. Affirmed." Such an opinion is even easier to write if
a court can conclude that the error was technical and thus that the burden
was on the defendant. The question now is what impact this trend has
had-and should have had-on peremptory challenge jurisprudence. Part
ill addresses that question.

Ross and Its Predecessors: Peremptory Challenges and Harmless

ill.

Error
The Supreme Court has considered the intersection of peremptory
challenges, challenges for cause, and error analysis a number of times.
The case providing the greatest hope for defendants is Gray v. Mississip

42.
43.
44.
45.

[d. at 307-08.
[d. at 309-10.
See id. at 285.
See id. at 302.
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pi,46 in which the Court reversed a death sentence based on errors in the
jury selection process47 and considered whether the improper excusal of
a juror for cause could ever be subjected to harmless error analysis. 48
During that process in the lower court, the State had used all of its
peremptory challenges to excuse jurors who were opposed to the death
penalty and who, as the Court concluded, should have been excused for
cause, despite the trial court's conclusion to the contrary.49 A later
potential juror indicated that she could vote to impose the death penalty in
certain circumstances, but that she was generally opposed to it. 50 The
state's attorneys argued (correctly) that the previous rulings on the
challenges for cause had been erroneous, and thus asked the trial court to
restore one peremptory challenge to allow the state to remove the
veniremember. 51 The trial court did not do so, but instead excused the
veniremember for cause as a way to make up for the previous mistakes. S2
The Gray Court concluded that the resulting death sentence could not
stand. 53 Davis v. Georgid4 had established that a misapplication of
Witherspoon v. Illinoiss constitutes per se reversible error. 56
Witherspoon held that a potential juror who has conscientious scruples
against the death penalty but who has shown that she can still serve (as the
veniremember here had done) ought not be removed for cause. 57 In a
series of summary reversals in subsequent years, the Court made clear just
how broad a constitutional mandate Davis was. 58 Gray reiterated that
breadth by "present[ing] yet another opportunity for [the] Court to adopt
a harmless-error analysis. ,,59 The Court chose not to avail itself of the
opportunity: "[O]nce again we decline to do SO.,,60
1\vo arguments were presented to the Court to entice it to apply
harmless error, and both were rejected. 61 The first, not directly relevant

46. 481 U.S. 648 (1987).
47. See id. at 668.
48. See generally id.
49. See id. at 653.
50. See id.
5!. See id. at 654.
52. See id. It is not explained why the court thought this was wise.
53. 481 U.S. at 668.
54. 429 U.S. 122, 123 (1976) (per curiam).
55. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
56. See Davis, 429 U.S. at 123.
57. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522.
58. See Gray, 481 U.S. at 664 n.14, 666 n.16 (cataloging summary reversals of death
sentences reached with a jury from which a Witherspoon-eligible juror had been excluded).
59. Id. at 660.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 660-61.
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here, pointed to the state's retention of unused peremptory challenges as an
indication that the erroneous for-cause exclusion was harmless, relying on
the state's representation that it would have removed the veniremember by
peremptory had the trial court refused to do so for cause. 62 The Court's
language rejecting this argument provides defendants useful language
(though it was later disavowed in Ross): "[T]he relevant inquiry is
'whether the composition of the jury panel as a whole could possibly have
been affected by the trial court's error. ,,,63 Based on the lack of assur
ance that the State really would have used its peremptory challenges in the
way it claimed, the Court concluded that the·panel indeed could possibly
have been affected.64
The second argument is more clearly relevant to the situation
discussed in this Article. The State urged the Court "to treat the erroneous
exclusion as an isolated incident without prejudicial effect if it cannot be
said that the ultimate panel did not fairly represent the community
anyway"6S-that is, to apply harmless error analysis. Though later
accepted in Ross, the Gray Court was unconvinced by this argument. The
Court noted that it had rejected the same conclusion in Davis v. Georgia
when reached by the Supreme Court of Georgia,66 and with it rejected the
application of harmless error analysis.
In a plurality portion of the opinion,67 Justice Blackmun and three
other justices made their conclusion explicit:
[B]ecause the impartiality of the adjudicator goes to the very integrity
of the legal system, the Chapman harmless-error analysis cannot apply.
We have recognized that "some constitutional rights [are] so basic to a
fair trial that their infraction can never by treated as harmless error."
The right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge or jury, is such a

62. See id. at 660. This actually is somewhat relevant when one considers my eventual
conclusion. I argue that a threshold question ought to be whether the defendant ended up using
all of his peremptory challenges. If not, he can show no possible harm, as he received all the
peremptory challenges he desired. However, when a defendant does use all of his peremptory
challenges, the Court's concern about the inability to say definitively that the prosecution would
have used another to strike a particular veniremember is relevant. The situation is somewhat
different factually, but still relevant.
63. [d. at 665 (quoting Moore v. Estelle, 670 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir. 1982) (specially
concurring opinion)).

64. See id.
65. [d. at 661.
66. See id. at 666 (citing Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 (1976) (per curiam)).
67. See id. at 670. Justice Powell joined all but one subpart of the opinion. See id. He
objected to the plurality'S focus in that subpart on the pattern with which the prosecutors used
their peremptory challenges, but his concurrence appears consistent with the statement I quote
from the plurality.
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That broad language was disavowed just one year later in Ross,
another capital conviction and death sentence on certiorari to the Supreme
Court. The posture of Ross was significantly different from that in Gray.
Put briefly, the trial court erroneously refused to strike a veniremember
named Darrell Huling, who "declared that if the jury found petitioner
guilty, he would vote to impose death automatically. "69 Failure to strike
a veniremember with such views is error under VifIinwright v. Witt. 70
The State in Ross conceded that "Huling should have been excused for
cause and that the trial court erred in failing to do so."71
Ross was forced under Oklahoma law to exercise a peremptory
challenge to remove Huling.72 Without doing so, he would have waived
any claim of error. Even using the peremptory strike virtually removed
any effective review unless he had both used all of his peremptory
challenges and the judge had made another erroneous ruling such that an
unqualified juror was seated.73

68. Id. at 668 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,23 (1967» (citation omitted).
69. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 84 (1988).
70. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
71. Ross, 487 U.S. at 85.
72. See id. at 89. The Court stated:
It is a long settled principle of Oklahoma law that a defendant who disagrees with
th~ trial court's

ruling on afor-cause challenge must, in order to preserve the claim

that the ruling deprived him of a fair trial, exercise a peremptory challenge to
remove the juror. Even then, the error is grounds for reversal only if the
defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced
upon him.
Id. (citing Ferrell v. State, 475 P.2d 825, 828 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970); Stott v. State, 538
P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975».
73. See Ross, 487 U.S. at 85; Ferrell, 475 P.2d at 828; Stott, 538 P.2d at 1064-65. Of
course, litigants must show some form of harm from claimed error on appeal, and the use of
a peremptory challenge to remove an erroneously-retained juror will ordinarily be the only way
to do so. Thus, Ross's lawyers were not acting differently from how they presumably would
have acted in another jurisdiction; the only difference here is the fact that Oklahoma required
it expressly. In any trial, Oklahoma or otherwise, harm would not occur if a litigant still had
unused peremptory challenges at the end of the jury selection process, even had she been forced
to use one or more of her peremptory challenges to remove jurors who should have been
removed for cause. Without some showing of harm-i.e., the loss of the use of a peremptory
challenge and perhaps an indication in the record of a juror who defense counsel would have
removed, had a peremptory challenge not been used to cure an erroneous ruling on a challenge
for cause-review is irrelevant.
Oklahoma, however, goes further, and the extra requirement, and the Court's focus on
it, makes a difference. Not only must a defendant show that she has used every one of her
peremptory challenges (and at least one of them to remove a veniremember who should have
been removed by the judge); the judge must make yet another mistake and refuse to grant an
extra peremptory challenge to the defendant, so that an incompetent juror is forced upon the
defendant. Thus, the harm of running out of peremptory challenges before the defendant's
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Thus, as noted earlier, Oklahoma law allows a judge in a capital case
to make up to nine unquestionably erroneous for-cause rulings, exhaust
entirely the defendant's peremptory challenges (while allowing the state its
full complement), and yet be immune from appellate review. Despite
Gray's language just a year before that "the relevant inquiry is 'whether
the composition of the jury panel as a whole could possibly have been
affected by the trial court's error,,,,74 the Ross court dismissed that view
as "def[ying] literal application. "75 To establish its argument, the Court
provided an example of a situation in which the view would not be applied:
"If, after realizing its error, the trial court in Gray had dismissed the entire
venire and started anew, the composition of the jury would undoubtedly
have been affected by the original error. But the Gray majority concedes
that the trial court could have followed that course without risking

reversal. ,,76 Because literal application would be inappropriate in one
rather extreme situation, the Court dubiously concludes that the language
should have no application whatsoever. The Court's reaching that
conclusion suggests more a desire to reject Gray wholesale rather than to
respect its precedential value. It would have been quite simple to modify
the statement in a more moderate way by supplementing the test to read:
"The relevant inquiry is whether the composition of the jury panel as a
whole could possibly have been affected by the trial court's error, and
whether that effect would most likely be detrimental to the party against
whom the erroneous ruling was made."
The Court, however, did not change the test in that way, instead
limiting Gray specifically to its situation-that is, a court's incorrect
excusal of an acceptable veniremember-and what the Ross Court claimed
was Gray's rationale: "the inability to know to a certainty whether the
prosecution could and would have used a peremptory challenge to remove
the erroneously excused juror. "77 Though that was certainly part of the
Gray Court's discussion, it is hard to say that it was "principal," given the
extensive discussion concerning the alternative argument which focused on
a lack of prejudice. The Gray Court rejected both arguments, and did not
reject the first one explicitly conditioned on the inability to know a
prosecutor's intentions.
After discarding the Gray language, the Ross Court emphasized the
nonconstitutional nature of peremptories and the fact that they are a

counsel has used all of them desired (up to the statutorily-provided number, of course) is not

enough, as it is in other states.
74. Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 665 (1987) (quoting Moore v. Estelle, 670 F.2d
56, 58 (5th Cir. 1982) (special1y concurring opinion».
75. Ross, 487 U.S. at 88 & n.2 (citing Gray, 481 U.S. at 678 (Scalia, J., dissenting».
76. [d. (citing Gray, 481 U.S. at 663-64 n.13).
77. [d. at 88.
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creature of state statute. 78 They function only as "a means to achieve the
end of an impartial jury. "79 "So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the
fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that
result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated."so
Ross also claimed a due process violation by the trial court by
"arbitrarily depriving him of the full complement of nine peremptory
challenges allowed under Oklahoma law. ,,81 Citing the Swain majority
to the effect that "[t]he denial of impairment or the right is reversible error
without a showing of prejudice,,,82 Ross, quite sensibly, claimed he was
not required to show prejudice. 83 The Court, however, disagreed.
Noting that the Swain court cited only federal cases in support of that
statement, it continued:
[E]ven assuming that the Constitution were to impose this same rule in
state criminal proceedings, petitioner's due process challenge would
nonetheless fail. Because peremptory challenges are a creature of
statute and are not required by the Constitution . . . it is for the State
to determine the number of peremptory challenges allowed and to define
their purpose and the manner of their exercise. 84
This argument, though facially appealing, is problematic. As the
dissent points out, "everyone concedes that the trial judge could not
arbitrarily take away one of the defendant's peremptory challenges. Yet,
that is in effect exactly what happened here."85 The majority latches onto
the fact that the denial of the use of a peremptory challenge was not
direct86-that is, the judge did not say, "Mr. Ross, because I don't like
your outfit, you'll only get eight peremptory challenges rather than nine."
Instead, the judge made what is conceded by all parties involved to have
been a mistake,87 and that mistake, combined with Oklahoma's required
use of peremptory challenges, had the same effect as the judge randomly
denying peremptory challenges. 88 But, apparently because there was an
extra step between the judge's mistake and the deprivation of a peremptory

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id. at 88-89.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id. at 89.
ld. (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)).

83. See id.
84. Id. (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 91-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at 90-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that because the defendant was
required by Oklahoma law to use one of his peremptory challenges to rectify the trial court's
error, his due process rights were not violated even though he was left with only eight
peremptory challenges to use at his "unfettered discretion" instead of nine).
87. See id. at 92 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
88. See id. at 91-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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challenge for the defendant, the majority saw no due process problems with
a nearly arbitrary denial of a peremptory challenge. 89
This is, of course, overstating things somewhat. A fairer view of it
is that Oklahoma has chosen two policy goals for peremptory challenges.
First, as is most commonly accepted, they help obtain an impartial jury by
allowing litigants to exclude veniremembers who are merely suspected of
being partial. Second, and less typically, they help to make errors by a
trial judge harmless even when doing so results in litigants having fewer
peremptory challenges left to further the first goal. Because the second
goal is presumably a legitimate state interest (and there is no reason to
believe it is not), Ross did not in fact have a peremptory challenge taken
away arbitrarily; it was in the name of a valid state goal. It is not, in fact,
as arbitrary as basing it on the color of his shirt. He received all to which
he was entitled under Oklahoma law.
In any case, Ross is now the law and Gray is limited in its scope, and
the focus in claims of error in jury selection may have changed. Under
Gray, courts focused on the errors themselves and the potential effects of
those errors. 90 Under Ross, unless a qualified juror has been erroneously
excused under Witherspoon in a capital case, courts are to focus on the
actual effects of the trial court's errors, even if the defendant has used all
of his peremptory challenges and requests more. 91 Unless an unqualified
juror is seated and the jury is thus biased-and that seating is a result of a
trial court error-the erroneous denial of a for-cause challenge and the
subsequent forced use of a peremptory challenge is unreversible if state law
requires the use of peremptory challenges to remove jurors who a litigant
believes ought to have been removed for cause.
However, though Ross is the law, it is by no means the last word in
some situations. The Courts specifically left two questions open, both
relevant to current due process challenges. First, what standard ought to
be applied in federal courts reviewing federal courts? Second, "in the
absence of Oklahoma's limitation on the 'right' to exercise peremptory
challenges, [does] 'a denial or impairment' of the exercise of peremptory
challenges occur if the defendant uses one or more challenges to remove

89. See id. at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at 87 (stating that "the relevant inquiry is 'whether the composition of the jury
panel as a whole could possibly have been affected by the trial court's error'") (quoting Gray
v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 665 (1987» (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
91. See id. at 86-87, 91 (stating that the Court declines to extend the rule of Gray beyond
its context with respect to the erroneous "Witherspoon exclusion" of a qualified juror in a
capital case and holding that Ross was not deprived of an impartial jury or any interest provided
by the State when he had to exercise one of his peremptory challenges to rectify the trial court's
error).
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jurors who should have been excused for cause"?92 Given the number of
jurisdictions, including the federal courts, which do not have Oklahoma's
requirements about the use of peremptory challenges to fix judges' errors,
these are important questions indeed-as recognized by the Supreme Court
in granting certiorari recently in a case out of the Ninth Circuit, United
States v. Martinez SalamT. CJ3 The next Part addresses the answers given
by Courts of Appeals leading up to the imminent conclusion of the Court.

IV.

What Protections Remain For Peremptory Challenges?

Various courts of appeals have interpreted Ross in different contexts,
some narrowly and some broadly. This Part will outline these interpreta
tions and present the arguments given by both the courts which have agreed
with my view that Ross can be rationally limited and those given by courts
which consider Ross to be dispositive in a wide range of situations. 94
The Ninth Circuit carne to consider erroneous denials of peremptory
challenges in United States v. Annigoni.9S However, it was not in the
posture of Ross or other similar cases. In the district court below, the
defense attempted to strike a Mr. Horn with a peremptory challenge. 96
The prosecution objected, claiming that the strike was racially motivat
ed. 97 The defendant put forth a race-neutral explanation for the strike
based on Horn's investment in a limited partnership that had been involved

92. Id. at 91 n.4.
93. 146 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1998), cert granted 119 S. Ct. 2365 (1999). The Ninth
Circuit's decision, which came after some four years in the circuit court, including mUltiple
rearguments, will be further discussed below.
94. Some courts have referred to this issue in dicta. Given the extensive discussion
provided in Annigoni and other cases, I will not provide a full discussion of these cases in the
text. See, e.g., Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson Wax Dev. Corp., 908 F.2d 1363, 1369 (7th
Cir. 1990) ("It is reversible error to deny a party to a jury trial the peremptory challenges to
which the rules of procedure entitle him, although it will rarely if ever be possible to show that
the trial would have come out differently with a different jury. ") (citing United States v.
Ruuska, 883 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 1989»; Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 240 (2d
Cir. 1998); United States v. Love, 134 F.3d 595 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 519 U.S. 1093 (1997);
United States v. McFerron, 163 F.3d 952 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Underwood, 122
F.3d 389 (7th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 2341 (1998).
95. 96 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1996).
96. See id. at 1135.
97. See id. See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986). Batson held that
a party challenging a peremptory strike must make a prima facie case of race-based use of
peremptory challenges, after which the burden shifts to the party making the strike. See id. at
96. If the user of the peremptory challenge can come forward with a race-neutral explanation,
the trial court must decide whether purposeful racial discrimination has been proved. See id.
at 97. See also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995) (explaining the three-step analysis
of Batson); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1991) (same).
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in litigation, but the court refused to allow the exercise of the strike
anyway.98 A panel of the circuit court concluded that the refusal to allow
the defendant's use of the peremptory challenge was error, but went on to
use harmless-error analysis.99 The court granted a rehearing en banc and
rejected the panel's use of harmless-error analysis.loo
After reviewing the history of peremptory challenges and their
interplay with challenges for cause, the court noted the long-standing
principle that "[a]n error in restricting the exercise of peremptory
challenges results in an automatic reversal. The defendant need not show
that he was prejudiced by the error." 101 It then turned to the govern
ment's invitation to apply harmless error in this case, despite the history
to the contrary. 102
After reviewing the trial-structural error spectrum, the court turned to
whether the erroneous denial of peremptory challenges could be harmless
error-that is, whether it could be deemed trial error. 103 It concluded
that it could not. I04 First, the error in the case before the court did not
occur during the presentation of the case to the jury, unlike most trial
errors. lOS Second, this error was not amenable to the quantitative
assessment of harmlessness suggested by Fulminate. 106 "[I]t would be
virtually impossible to determine whether the denial of a peremptory
challenge was harmless enough to warrant affirming the conviction ... 107
Indeed,
[t]o apply a harmless-error analysis in this context would be to misap
prehend the very nature of peremptory challenges. The peremptory
challenge is used precisely when there is no identifiable basis on which
to challenge a particular juror for cause. . .. Although a litigant may
suspect that a potential juror harbors an unarticulated bias or hostility,
that litigant would be unable to demonstrate that bias or hostility to an
appellate court reviewing for harmless error. Similarly, the government
would be hard-pressed to bear its burden of proving that the seating of
a peremptorily challenged juror did not harm the defendant. 108
This lack of information about the potential harm led to the court's

98. See Annigoni, 96 F.3d at 1136.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 1134.
101. [d. at 1141 (quoting United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1977»
(alteration in original).
102. See id. at 1142.
103. See id. at 1143.
104. See id. at 1144.
105. See id.
106. See id. (referencing Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279, 308 (1991».
107. [d.
108. [d. at 1144-45.
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conclusion, combined with "the dearth of information concerning what
went on in the jury room. To subject the denial of a peremptory challenge
to barmless-error analysis would require appellate courts to do the
impossible: to reconstruct what went on in jury deliberations through
nothing more than post-trial hearings and sheer speculation."I09
After concluding, based on the rationales and history of harmless-error
analysis, that such analysis ought not apply to erroneous denials of
peremptory challenges, the circuit court turned to Ross and its potential
application. 110 It found Ross unavailing for the government's position
that harmless-error analysis should apply, finding three important
distinctions.
The first distinction the court made was that Ross did not involve the
erroneous direct denial of a peremptory challenge, unlike the case at bar
which presented the outright denial of such a challenge. 111 This is, at
some level, a distinction without a difference, as it opens the door to a
court's prevention of the use of any peremptory challenges, but the court
is correct at least in that it looks different.
More significantly to the court, the juror involved in Ross did not end
up sitting on the jury, thus, according to the court, eliminating the
difficulty of predicting the effects of the error on the eventual result. 112
This distinction is not in fact particularly impressive, either, given that
some juror against whom the defense would otherwise have exercised a

peremptory in Ross sat on the jury. Nonetheless, the case £1cing the
Annigoni court did present a more specific veniremember who sat on the
court who the defense would have preferred not to be there. The harm
was more visible.
The final factor on which the court relied was Ross's emphasis on
peremptory challenges as a creature of statute.1I3 In Ross, the defendant
did, at a literal but not entirely meaningful level, receive all of the
peremptory challenges to which he was entitled under state law. 114 In
Annigoni, he was arbitrarily denied outright a peremptory. liS There is
no law commanding federal judges to deny the use of peremptory
challenges to criminal defendants accused of racial bias even when the
defendants can present plausible race-neutral reasons for the challenges;
indeed, such an action was indisputably error. The district court took away
something to which the defendant had a statutory right. This final
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

[d. at 1145.
See id. at 1146.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 89 (1988).
See Annigoni, 96 F.3d at 1146.
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distinction is the most convincing, given the arguments provided above as
to the first two.
Though Annigoni is not, as noted, directly relevant to either of the
questions left open by Ross, it strongly suggests that the Ninth Circuit
looks askance at attempts to avoid harmless error analysis when the error
claimed makes unavailable a peremptory challenge in some way. Thus, it
hints that the Ninth Circuit would not apply harmless error in situations
except those precisely like Ross: that is, only when a state requires the use
of a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who a litigant ought to
remove for cause. 116
The Ninth Circuit's hint in Annigoni became reality in United States
v. Martinez-Salazar,117 a case which was recently heard by the Supreme
Court. Facing a now-familiar factual situation, where the trial court

erroneously denied a for-cause challenge and a defendant used a perempto
ry challenge to remove the juror, the court held specifically that the
defendant's due process rights were violated, despite aclmowledging that
the jury seated was constitutionally permissible. 118
The Third Circuit concluded in a 1989 case, United States v.
Ruuska,119 that "the denial or impairment of the right to peremptory
challenges is reversible error per se." 120 In that case, the judge appar
ently misunderstood an attempt made by the defense attorney to exercise
a peremptory challenge which the judge had granted him. 121 Thus, the

116. See id. at 1139. Again, it is fair to say that even the Ninth Circuit would be skeptical
of such claims if a defendant still had peremptory challenges at the end of jury selection and
chose not to use them to remove the juror about whom he complains on appeal. When harm
could so easily be avoided, without any deleterious effects on the defendant, sympathy is not
likely. It is possible that defendants would then attempt to implant error by using all of their
peremptory challenges on other borderline veniremembers to keep the complained-of
veniremember on the jury. To the extent this happens, it may simply be a cost of fair trials and
impossible to avoid.
117. 135 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1998), cert granted 119 S. Ct. 2365 (1999).
118. See id. at 658-59.
119. 883 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1989).
120. [d. at 268 (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965».
121. See id. at 267-68. The veniremember involved came up in a rather unusual situation,
wl>ich increased the confusion. "After voir dire and the seating of the jury, but before the jury
was sworn, the juror in seat Number 9, William Nichols, rose and stated 'I feel that I have
sympathies for the defendant there; possibly, if! could be excused from this panel.'" [d. at
266. After an interview in chambers, the judge excused Nichols. See id. Instead of using one
of the alternates obtained through the prior selection process, the judge (without explanation)
chose to draw another veniremember and to give each side an additional peremptory challenge
to use if either side was displeased with the person. See id. at 266-67. Upon being presented
with the potential juror, the defendant's attorney chose to say "we are objecting." [d. at 267.
The government argued that such a statement did not constitute an attempt to exercise a

peremptory challenge. See id. The Third Circuit rejected that view, stating "We conclude that
this constituted a timely attempt by the defense to exercise the peremptory challenge granted
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issue presented by Ross and this Article was not present, but the court used
broad language without any indication that exceptions existed. Oddly, the
government apparently did not cite Ross, nor did the circuit court cite it or
address the potential difficulties created by it. 122 Had the issue been
presented, the final rationale used by the Ninth Circuit in Annigoni may
have been successful here as well. The judge granted the defendant an
additional peremptory challenge, the argument goes, so he could not
arbitrarily take it away again. The defendant did not receive all of the
peremptory challenges to which he was entitled, and so harmless error
analysis is arguably inappropriate.
That potential argument reached fruition in the Third Circuit in Kirk
v. Raymark Industries, Inc. l23 There, the court simply noted that Ross
left open the question of the appropriate result when the law in the
jurisdiction does not mandate the use of peremptory challenges to preserve
error in for-cause rulings. Because that was absent in federal court, the

court concluded that it was "not . . . a difficult issue," 124 holding "that
compelling a party to use any number of its statutorily-mandated perempto
ry challenges to strike a juror who should have been removed for cause is
tantamount to giving the party less than its full allotment of peremptory
challenges"l2S and "a showing of prejudice is not required to reverse a
verdict after demonstrating that a statutorily-mandated, peremptory
challenge was impaired. "126
Presumably, the Third Circuit's result hinted at in Ruuska and reached
in Kirk would also apply to state schemes which do not mandate the use of
peremptory challenges to remove veniremembers challenged unsuccessfully
for cause. In such a case, it seems likely that the impairment of a
"statutorily-mandated, peremptory challenge"127 would result in automatic
reversal, assuming the full complement of peremptory challenges was used
so the defendant could establish actual impairment.
In a 1993 case, the Fifth Circuit declined to extend Ross as well. In
United States v. Broussard,l28 the court considered whether the Batson
line of cases should extend to peremptory challenges allegedly based on
gender. 129 Though it turned out that the court got that question wrong
in concluding that such challenges were not in violation of the Constitu

by the court." Id. at 268.

122. See generally Ruuska, 883 F.2d 262.
123. 61 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1995).
124. Id. at 157.

125. Id.
126. Id. at 160.
127. Id.

128. 987 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1993).
129. See id. at 217 (referencing to Baston v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
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tion,130 it went on to consider whether harmless-error analysis would
apply to an erroneous ruling on that issue by a district court. 131 In
concluding that it should not, the court echoed the theme outlined above:
that harmless-error analysis only applies if the defendant receives all of that
to which he is entitled. 132 "Applying the doctrine in this context would
eviscerate the right to exercise peremptory challenges, because it would be
virtually impossible to determine that these rulings [were not] injurious to
the perceived fairness of the petit jury. "133
The First Circuit, though it affirmed a conviction in United States v.
Cambara,l34 actually provided additional support for the idea that
impairment of a statutorily provided peremptory challenge is reversible per
se. There, the trial court had granted an extra two peremptory challenges
to the defendant beyond those guaranteed by statute. 135 The court had
refused a challenge for cause against a veniremember against whom the
defendant ended up using one of his "extra" peremptory challenges. 136
The circuit court noted that the decision on the challenge for cause was

close enough to likely not be error, but emphasized also that the perempto
ry challenge the defendant was forced to use was not statutorily guaran
teed. 137 "[Defendant] cites no cases holding that the impairment of an
additional peremptory challenge violates any rights of the defendant. "138
However, the general rule remained true for the court: "[R]estricting a
defendant's use of the lawful number of peremptory challenges is reversible
error if a challenge for cause is erroneously denied." 139
Thus, again, in the federal system and those state systems without an
Oklahoma-like rule, the use of a peremptory challenge to remove a juror
who should have been removed for cause is reversible error per se under
these cases' rationales, if the defendant can show actual impairment of his
statutorily-provided peremptory challenges by using all of them.

130. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994) (overruling Broussard, holding that
litigants are barred from using peremptory challenges to strike veniremembers based on
gender).
131. See Broussard, 987 F.2d at 221.
132. See id.
133. [d.
134. 902 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1990).
135. See id. at 147.
136. See id. at 145-46, 147.
137. See id. at 147-48.
138. [d. at 148.
139. [d. at 147. Here it appears that the First Circuit is somewhat less generous to
defendants than the Third Circuit in Ruuska. The Third Circuit held that the impairment of

peremptory challenges legitimately granted to a criminal defendant by ajudge to be reversible
error, whereas the First Circuit here relies on that distinction to find no harm when the
challenge in issue is an "extra" one.
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At least two courts of appeals have reached a contrary result, a
situation which has resulted in the Supreme Court's current consideration
of the issue. 14O The Tenth Circuit faced the issue in Getter v. Vial-Mart
Stores, Inc. 141 In this personal injury case in federal court,142 the judge
refused to dismiss a prospective juror for cause despite the fact that the
veniremember owned stock in and his wife was employed by the defendant
company. 143 The plaintiff exercised a peremptory challenge to remove
the juror. l44 The circuit court concluded that the district court abused its
discretion in failing to grant the challenge for cause, but affirmed under a
harmless-error theory based on Ross. 145
The analysis provided is disappointingly brief, noting only that the
plaintiff did receive the full number of peremptory challenges granted to
him by law, as did ROSS.I46 Although this is true in a surface sense, it
ignores the important differences between the Oldahoma law at issue in
Ross (which requires the use of the peremptory challenge) and the federal
rules at issue in the case at bar (which do not). 147 The court, however,
merely noted that the plaintiff's lawyer got up and uttered something like
the phrase "We would like to use a peremptory challenge to strike that
veniremember" the appropriate number of times, and chose not to
distinguish between removing jurors who should have been struck for cause
and removing those who should not. l48 Based on the view that the
140. The Eleventh Circuit has considered the issue at least twice, in United States v.
Farmer, 923 F.2d 1557, 1566 (11th Cir. 1991) and Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126, 1132-33
(11th Cir. 1991), both times rejecting the defendant's argument. Neither case appears to have
presented a clear opportunity to examine Ross with any care, however, with Farmer addressing
Ross only as a fallback position, apparently not even raised by the defendant, because the
defendant (erroneously) claimed that certain jurors had sat whom had not. See Farmer, 923
F.2d at 1566. Thus, the Ross argument was reached only by implication and dismissed quickly.
See id. In Heath, a habeas review of a state conviction, it again appears from the brief
discussion that Ross was not centrally discussed, as the court failed to recognize that Ross left
open the appropriate result outside of Oklahoma. See Heath, 941 F.2d at 1132-33. Although
the Tenth and Eighth Circuit discussions are somewhat lacking in discussion, I find the Eleventh
Circuit to be even less complete in its analysis, and so I leave it here, tentatively in the Ross
extension column but not strongly so.
141. 66 F.3d 1119 (10th Cir. 1995).
142. This is a situation where the distinction between criminal and civil litigation might
be relevant. The Tenth Circuit indicated no limitation on its opinion to civil cases; in fact, it
didn't even recognize the question. Because its opinion does not rest upon any distinction, I
do not explore it here except to note that the relatively weaker protections for civil litigants
could impact some courts' consideration of the issue.
143. See id. at 1122.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 1122-23.

146. See id. at 1123.
147. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 89-91 (1988); see also Getter, 66 F.3d at 1123;
28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1998).
148. See Getter, 66 F.3d at 1123 ("[p]laintiff received all the peremptory challenges
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plaintiff got all to which he was entitled, the court applied harmless-error

analysis. 149 This, not surprisingly, resulted in no reversible error being
found because no constitutionally impermissible jurors sat. 150
Given the fact that the court was "troubled that one result of [its]
holding may be the creation of a formidable barrier to appellate review of
denials of for-cause challenges," 151 it is particularly unfortunate that the
only attempt to reduce the harm of its decision was to rather lamely note
that "there may be instances in which a party can show that the erroneous
denial of a for-cause challenge substantially affected the outcome of a
trial. "152 When that instance would occur is difficult to conceive;
perhaps if a judge was so incompetent that he made more erroneous for
cause challenge rulings than a litigant had peremptory challenges, the Tenth
Circuit would find that the error was not harmless. In any case, the court
failed to recognize the important differences between its case and the Ross
case, thus distinguishing itself from the other circuit courts. In the Tenth
Circuit, the erroneous refusal to strike veniremembers for cause is virtually
unreviewable unless a defendant also runs out of peremptory challenges and
the judge makes yet another mistake. While the resulting jury may be
constitutionally sound, it seems evident that such an impairment of the right
to peremptory challenge is not what the legislatures and Congress intended.
The Eighth Circuit has been more complete in its discussion of the
Ross question. A recent summary of its cases can be found in United
States v. Sithithongtham,153 where a three-judge panel considered the
Three
appeal of a conviction for various firearms violations. 154
veniremembers indicated a tendency to believe the police officers'
testimony more readily than others; the district court refused to remove

those jurors on defendant's challenge for cause, and the defendant removed
all three with peremptory challenges. 155 The circuit court had little
difficulty concluding that such refusal was an abuse of discretion,156 but
the Ross issue remained ..
After reviewing Ross, the court turned to the Eighth Circuit's
precedent in the context, which turned out to be controlling. United States
v. Amerson l57 looked to be helpful for the defendant. In that 1991 case,

allowed by statute. ")
149. See id. at 1122.
150. See id. at 1123.
151. [d. at 1123 n.3.
152. [d.

153. 192 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir. 1999).
154. See id. at 1120.
155. See id. at 1120-21.
156. See id. at 1121.

157. 938 F.2d 116 (8th Cir. 1991).
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a conviction was reversed under similar circumstances: the defendant was
forced to use peremptory challenges to remove veniremembers who should
have been removed for cause. 158 Such a result implied that the court
considered the erroneous denial of challenges for cause to be automatically
reversible even if the objectionable veniremember was removed via
peremptory challenge, but, importantly, the issue was not expressly
discussed.
Unfortunately for the defendant, later Eighth Circuit cases did discuss
the issue and reached a contrary result. Both United States v. Cruz lS9
and United States v. Horsmanl(IJ faced essentially indistinguishable
situations and affirmed the convictions, ruling that, because the panel that
actually convicted the defendant was unbiased, the Sixth Amendment was
not offended, and because peremptory challenges are not constitutional,
neither was the Fifth Amendment. 161
Under those cases, the panel in Sithithongtham found itself bound to
affirm the conviction as well. Interestingly, two of the three panel
members filed concurring opinions, one expressing his dislike for the Cruz
Horsman rule l62 and one enthusiastically endorsing it. 163
None of the pro-affirmance opinions in the trio of cases recognized the
fundamental difficulty in applying the Ross approach to federal criminal
cases: the Oklahoma approach to peremptory challenges, with two policies
being furthered, is different from the federal system. In Oklahoma,
cleaning up after the judge is one of the purposes for peremptory
challenges, and has been for some time. The federal system has no such
history or policy, and the courts applying Ross to such situations fail to

recognize the structural disjunction, even though Ross itself recognized it.
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits focused on the lack of a Sixth Amendment
violation, because the jury seated was unbiased, but barely even address the
significant due process concerns raised by arbitrarily denying the use of a
defendant's full complement of peremptory challenges.
A second, and somewhat ancillary, problem with extending Ross can

158. See id. at 117-18.
159. 993 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1993).
160. 114 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1997).
161. See Cruz, 993 F.2d at 169; Horsman, 114 F.3d at 825.
162. See id. at *5 (Gibson, J., concurring specially) ("To be required to use peremptory
challenges to remove such venire members [who should have been removed for cause] was
fundamentally unfair and is grounds for reversal. ").
163. See id. at *5-6 (Bowman, 1., concurring) ("Adoption ofa rule contrary to the one we
have applied to the peremptory challenge issue in this case could only result in a grave
disservice to tl]e administration ofjustice, with verdicts reached by juries after scrupulously fair
and error-free trials being reversed for no better reason than that the defendant used one or
more peremptory challenges to strike one or more potential jurors whom the trial judge,
exercising his or her discretion, has declined to remove for cause. ").
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be seen in a very recent Eighth Circuit case, United States v. Jones. 164
There, the defendant challenged two of the trial court's denials of
challenges for cause, both based on a belief that police officers are less
likely to testify falsely.l65 The defendant peremptorily struck one of the
two veniremembers, but not the other, who ended up being seated on the
jury. 166 After noting that there was no allegation that the defendant had
failed to strike the juror as an attempt to implant error in the trial (though
such a conclusion does not seem unreasonable), and after noting that the
federal common law does not require the use of a peremptory challenge to
correct the court's error (unlike Oklahoma's), the court reversed because
the refusal to strike was an abuse of discretion and the veniremember
actually sat on the panel. 167
If Ross is indeed extended as in the Eighth Circuit's previous cases,
defense lawyers may well make the strategic decision to leave one "bad"
juror on the panel to have a built-in appellate issue. If the mistake of the

trial court is bad enough, the defendant will get to strike other less
obviously objectionable veniremembers and maintain a chance of review
if a conviction ensues. Of the various consequences of such a decision,
this one would seem to balance out any improvement in judicial economy
and undercut the goals of the system, where we do not want to encourage
intentionally implanted error. This additionally points to a serious flaw in
the logic of extending Ross to situations in which the jurisdiction does not
require the use of peremptory challenges to have any chance to preserve
error on appeal. Unlike in Oklahoma, where leaving the objectionable
juror on the panel would waive any right to appeal that issue, in the Eighth
Circuit and anywhere Ross has been extended, leaving the veniremember
on the jury is the only way to appeal it. This perverse incentive makes
evident that Ross just does not fit outside its context, and any attempt to
force a fit results in such unintended consequences.

v.

Conclusion

Ross v. Oklahoma appears to have the potential of great harm for the
jury process, at least if one believes that peremptory challenges are
essential for a fair trial. On its surface, it holds the possibility of removing
from effective review a large percentage of judges' decisions on challenges
for cause. It need not be read so broadly, however.

164.
165.
166.
167.

193 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. Oct. 13, 1999).
See id. at 950.
See id.
See id. at 952.

76

AM. J. CRIM. L.

[Vol 27:49

The important basis on which Ross can be distinguished from many
other situations is the unique facts and legal requirements underlying it.
The typical understanding of peremptory challenges is that they are used
tactically and help advance the goal of a fair trial. Oklahoma and a
significant number of other states, however, have a second, and presum
ably permissible, agenda for the challenges to further, enlisting their aid in
reducing the harm caused by error-prone judges. By having a speCific
requirement that defendants use their peremptory challenges to remove
jurors who are not removed for cause, and by holding hannless any error
unless it results in a juror being seated who ought to have been removed
for cause, Oklahoma may have improved judicial efficiency. Because
Oklahoma has made that choice, defendants who lose peremptory
challenges to judicial mistakes have not lost anything to which they were
entitled: there is not even a possibility of harm, as long as no jurors who
ought to have been removed for cause are seated. A lack of harm can be
quantified as zero; thus, under hannless error analysis, no reversal is
necessary. 168

This should not, however, be read as an endorsement of the practice
adopted by Oklahoma. I view peremptory challenges somewhat ambiva
lently, but it intuitively seems wrong when a defendant (or the state, for
that matter, though review issues are obviously less relevant) loses a
peremptory challenge due to a judge's error. If we are to have peremptory
challenges, I certainly prefer a system other than Oldahoma's.
In these other systems, Ross does not necessarily eviscerate appellate
review of for-cause rulings, despite the Eighth and Tenth Circuits'
conclusion to the contrary. Unlike Ross-type cases, defendants in other
states and in the federal system can show harm to a right they actually pos
sess, the (mostly) unencumbered right to exercise peremptory challenges
on veniremembers not otherwise challengeable for cause. The Ross Court
left the question of such situations. open for a reason, for they truly are
different. When that right is infringed, defendants can open the door to
consideration of whether or not to apply hannless-error analysis.

168. Perhaps a better approach for the Court to take in this situation is not to decide
whether harmless error analysis ought to apply under the structural-trial error dichotomy, but
instead to, as a threshold matter, determine if any harm could have occurred. In the Ross
situation, though there was a mistake by the judge, the defendant received all to which he was
entitled, and made no claim that anyone on the jury should have been struck for cause. See
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 91 (1988). The question thus was not really whether
harmless-error analysis ought to apply, but whether under any analysis the defendant's rights
were harmed by the judge's error. Because they were not, the Court could have avoided
reaching the discussion of harmless error in the first place, merely rejecting the defendant's
arguments based on the fact that he could show no harm at all, and so could not even get in the
door. However, the Court did not follOW this approach. See id. at 88-91.

1999]

The Intersection of Peremptory Challenges

77

A necessary result of the presence of harm (which should get
defendants in that door) is the recognition that such harm is not amenable
to anything like quantifiable analysis as required for the application of
harmless-error analysis. While in Ross the defendant had no right
infringed and so no harm to quantify, defendants in other systems who
exhaust their peremptory challenges in part due to judge error have been
harmed but in a rather fuzzy way. The jury room is a secret place and will
remain so, and no court can predict what would have happened with on
different juror on any jury. Such errors must then be classified as
structural errors and not amenable to harmless error analysis.
Even if the error is classified as a trial error-which seems unlikely,
but possible-and thus harmless error analysis is applied, neither Ross nor
any other cases should lead to a conclusion that a defendant whose
peremptory challenges were infringed in violation of the jurisdiction's laws
cannot have the verdict reversed. Whether on direct or collateral review,
the error is almost certain to be seen as one whose "natural effect is to
prejudice a litigant's substantial rights,,169 and thus, assuming that Brecht
left the burden allocation untouched,170 the prosecution will have to prove
the lack of harm. On direct review, this means that the prosecution would
be forced to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to the verdict, a burden almost certain to be impossible to meet.
On habeas corpus, the prosecution has a slightly easier job-they must
prove that it did not have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict,,171-but again, proving the negative seems
impossible, given the closed nature of jury deliberations. Both results, in
fact, provide a strong argument as to why the error should be seen as
structural, as it is quite obviously difficult to quantify. The fact that the
burden distribution is so dispositive-that is, that the party on whom the
burden is placed is almost certain to lose-emphasizes the inherently
nonquantitative nature of the issue. Regardless of its classification,
however, criminal defendants should still win on the issue in most
situations. The effectively arbitrary denial of peremptory challenges, to
which defendants have a clear right, should be considered a due process
violation under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.
This conclusion has the potential to be even stronger in cases wholly

169. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760 (1946).
170. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 647 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 653
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 641 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Sherman v. Smith, No.
92-6947, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 28095, at *9-10 (4th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the burden
of establishing hannless error remains on the state when non-"technical" errors are involved);
Blume & Garvey, supra note 32, at 166-69 (concluding that the burden should remain on the
state post-Brecht).
171. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 (referring to Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776».
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within the federal system. Federal appellate courts have a particularly
strong interest in furthering the goals of Congress as reflected in statutes
and procedural rules; with such an interest, requiring reversal of cases
involving the impairment of peremptory challenges could be even more
appealing to circuit courts and the Supreme Court. Even without such an
interest, though, reversal is appropriate in virtually all cases with such
impairment. 172
In all cases considering claims such as those discussed here, it seems
appropriate to require that defendants exhaust all peremptory challenges
before they complain of erroneous refusals of for-cause challenges. When
a defendant could readily eliminate any possibility of harm from such an
error, it is simply sensible to have such a requirement. 173
In sum, the Tenth Circuit in Getter and the Eighth Circuit in Cruz and
Horsman got it wrong. In their (brief) consideration of the issue, they
recognized surface similarity and failed to recognize the crucial differences
in the foundational issues underlying the cases, and in fact introduced an
incentive to do the ethically questionable by leaving on the jury
veniremembers who should be removed for cause. Holding to the
contrary, as most other circuits facing the question have done, is not really
even a limitation of Ross because Ross, which at its core is a recognition
that unencumbered peremptory challenges are not guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment and can be modified by states, is not easily or logically
extended to other situations where peremptory challenges have not been so
modified. Ross is a product of its posture, and ought to remain so. When
judicial errors encroach on clearly-established rights in jury selection,
adverse verdicts should be reversed without showing of effect on the
verdict, because such errors violate defendants' due process rights under
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. Even if some showing is required,
the burden should remain on the prosecution. Such a burden will virtually
never be satisfied, thus resulting in reversal.
In almost all cases, peremptory challenges will remain a means for
litigants to remove jurors "who are not challengeable for cause, but in
whom the litigant perceives bias or hostility"174-that is, a protection
separate and distinct, though related to, challenges for cause. Such
separate protection is what was intended by the majority ofjurisdictions in

172. As noted previously, the government has proposed implementing such a rule as
Supreme Court-made law in Martinez-Salazar.
173. It has been suggested that defendants should be required to request additional
peremptory challenges as well. This is certainly appropriate in most situations, but it should
be noted that some states, including Oklahoma, have held that a trial court has no authority to
grant additional peremptory challenges. See Denham v. State, 192 P. 241, 244 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1919).
174. United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1996).
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adopting peremptory challenges, and their interests should be respected and
facilitated by allowing for reversal of cases involving the impairment of
those interests. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will do so in Martinez

Salazar.
VI.

Epilogue
As this Article goes to press, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in

United States v. Martinez-Salamr.175 The unanimous opinion, to put it
bluntly, rejects or ignores the arguments presented by the defendant, which
paralleled those in this Article.
As noted previously, the government in Martinez-Salamr first
proposed reading an Oklahoma-like requirement into federal peremptory
challenge law, so that a defendant would be required to exercise a
peremptory challenge to remove any veniremember whom the defendant
believed should be excused for cause. 176 So holding would have put the
case squarely within the universe controlled by Ross. The Court declined

to read such a requirement into the Rule, noting that the only control
previously read into peremptory challenge usage was preventing their
discriminatory usage, and choosing not to explicitly require more. In
With that resolved, the Court turned to the issue discussed in this
Article. In a discussion taking fewer than three Westlaw textual columns,
the Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, found no
violation of the defendant's rights. 178 The fundamental determination
underlying the decision can be found in the first paragraph addressing the
issue: "The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the District Court's
for-cause mistake compelled Martinez-Salazar to challenge [the
veniremember] peremptorily, thereby reducing his allotment of peremptory
challenges by one. A hard choice is not the same as no choice." 179 In
the Court's view, Martinez-Salazar received "all he is entitled to under
... Rule [24]. "ISO
The conclusion reversing the Ninth Circuit is thus unsurprising. If the
Court is correct that Martinez-Salazar received all to which he was entitled,
then he can clearly point to no harm. The basis upon which the Court
concluded that he did receive all to which he was entitled-he could have

175. 120 S. Ct. 774 (2000). The opinion came out less than two months after the
November 29, 1999, argument.
176. See id. at 781.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 782.
179. [d. at 781 (citation omitted).
180. [d.
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left the veniremember on the jury and "tak[en] his chances on appeal"181
and thus "did not lose a peremptory challenge"I82-opens a can of worms
which perhaps would have been better left closed. As I argue in this
Article, such an approach invites defense lawyers to intentionally implant
error (and potentially commit malpractice) by leaving objectionable
veniremembers on the jury to preserve an appellate issue. 183 This
conclusion seems to misapprehend the realities of jury selection: not only
is it, as the Court rightly notes, "fast paced"l84 but, more importantly,
when a for-cause challenge is rejected, no trial lawyer in her right mind
would leave that veniremember on the panel. It is not simply a "hard
choice." It is the lawyer's professional duty as an advocate. It is, in fact,
no choice at all, notwithstanding the Court's claims to the contrary. ISS
Nonetheless, once the use of a peremptory challenge is framed as a
choice, just like the remainder of a defendant's peremptory challenges, the
question dissolves and, as Justice Ginsburg notes, harmless error analysis
becomes irrelevant. 186 In that view of the case, Martinez-Salazar did
receive all to which he was entitled and was not harmed by his judge's
error. In so ruling, the Court has further blurred the distinction between
challenges for cause and peremptory challenges, and, whether the opinion
acknowledged it or not, imposed a de facto requirement to use peremptory
challenges to correct judges' errors in deciding for-cause challenges.
Peremptory challenges, and their unique place in our jurisprudence, are
weaker for it.

181. [d. at 781.
182. [d. at 782.

183. Indeed, Justice Scalia, in a concurrence joined by Justice Kennedy, recognizes the
difficult issues presented by such a conclusion, arguing first that the question was not before
the Court (which is true) and second, that principles of waiver and vo/enti non fit injuria
(roughly the equivalent of assumption of risk) should preclude such a course of action. See id.
at 783 (Scalia, J., concurring).
184. [d. at 782.
185. Justice Souter, in his concurrence, seems to recognize the harshness of the Court's
conclusion. He notes that Martinez-Salazar does not decide what would happen if the trial court
refuse[d] to afford a defendant a peremptory challenge beyond the maximum
otherwise allowed, when he has used a peremptory challenge to cure an erroneous
denial of a challenge for cause and when he shows that he would otherwise use his
full complement of peremptory challenges for the noncurative purposes that are the
focus of the peremptory right.
[d. at 783 (Souter, J., concurring). In this concurrence, there remains a reed, albeit a mighty
slim one, on which defendants may rest their hopes.
186. See id. at 782 nA.

